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AD RULES INFINITUM: THE NEED FOR
ALTERNATIVES TO STATE-BASED ETHICS
GOVERNING LEGAL SERVICES MARKETING
William E. Hornsby, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
For most of the Twentieth Century, lawyer advertising was
prohibited. Beginning with the Canons of Ethics ("Canons"),'
adopted by the American Bar Association (the "ABA" or "Associa-
tion") in 1908, it was unethical for lawyers to advertise or engage
in most forms of marketing.2 The 1977 United States Supreme
Court decision of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona3 held that, under
the First Amendment doctrine of commercial speech, states did
not have the right to ban lawyer advertising.4 The decision, how-
ever, gave states the responsibility to regulate this activity.5 This
began an experiment to balance consumer protection with the
flow of legal commerce that continues on a state-by-state basis
today.
Despite the ABA's adoption of provisions addressing lawyer
advertising and solicitation in the Model Code of Professional Re-
* Staff counsel to the American Bar Association Commission on Responsibility in Cli-
ent Development, a/k/a Commission on Advertising. The views expressed by the author
are his own and should not be construed as the views or policies of the American Bar As-
sociation. In fact, for the purpose of intellectual dialogue, the author sets forth concepts
that are inconsistent with some policies of the ABA. The author would like to thank Pro-
fessor Rodney A. Smolla and all those involved in the 2001 Allen Chair Symposium for in-
viting him to participate.
1. ABA CANONS OF ETHIcs (1908).
2. See id. at 26-28. The Canons were quickly and widely adopted by the states.
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 42 (1976).
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4 Id. at 384.
5. Id. at 383-84.
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sponsibility6 (the "Model Code") and later the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct7 (the "Model Rules"), the states have embarked
on their own courses of rule-making, emphasizing and addressing
different aspects of business development.8 While many states
have adopted portions of the Model Rules governing the commu-
nications of legal services, no two states have identical ethics pro-
visions in this area.9
Some states have adopted ethics rules that go to, or perhaps
exceed, the constitutional limit of commercial speech. Many
states have imposed requirements that are inconsistent with fun-
damentals of client development and therefore dissuade lawyers
from advertising and marketing." Expansive definitions of mis-
leading statements, required disclaimers, and bans on client tes-
timonials found within the state rules create higher standards for
business development in the legal community than perhaps in
any other business or profession."
The inherent state-based regulation, the inconsistencies among
states, and the high standards combine to make it difficult, if not
impossible, for the Twenty-first Century multi-jurisdictional law
firm to fully comply. The complexity of global law firms with
hundreds of lawyers who are admitted to practice in a variety of
jurisdictions, competing for business under the guidance of pro-
fessional marketing staffs and using sophisticated business de-
velopment strategies, creates a setting that precludes compliance
with the nuances of state-based rules governing client develop-
ment. Firms are then faced with a choice: to comply fully and
limit their ability to compete in the global marketplace, or to dis-
regard the rules and assume the risk that their lawyers may face
disciplinary charges for the firm's failure to comply with the eth-
ics rules.
6. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT (1983).
8. For online links to the specific state ethics provisions governing the communica-
tions of legal services, see Comm'n on Responsibility in Client Dev., Links to State Ethics
Rules Governing Lawyer Advertising, Solicitation and Marketing, ABA Network, at
http://www.abanet.org/adrules/ (last modified Jan. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Links to State Eth-
ics Rules].
9. See id.
10. See COMNIM'N ON ADVERTISING, ABA, LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS:
PROF'L POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 110-19 (1995) [hereinafter CROSSROADS].
11. See id.
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As a result, the legal profession needs to consider the extent to
which its current state-based system of regulating business de-
velopment successfully balances consumer protection and the
flow of legal commerce. To the extent the status quo fails to meet
the needs of the legal profession, policy-makers must explore
various options to correct the balance. One such option is uni-
formity in both rules and their interpretations. Another option is
to focus on hortatory measures that may better achieve the real
goals of the legal profession and cede the governance of business
development to the legislative branch.
This article begins with an examination of the history of regu-
lating legal services marketing. Understanding this history is im-
portant to understand the current status of varied state regula-
tions. Part III examines aspects of the current state ethics rules,
illustrating the willingness of states to adopt and maintain rules
that push the constitutional limitations regulating the communi-
cations of legal services. Part III concludes with a look at the
scope of the state rules and their application to lawyers involved
in client development in one state, but admitted to practice in an-
other.
Part IV examines the nature of corporate, multi-jurisdictional
law firms and the impact of the application of state rules govern-
ing the communications of legal services. Part V explores alterna-
tives to the current status of state-based regulation, seeking ways
in which the legal profession can successfully obtain the balance
of consumer protection with the flow of legal commerce.
II. THE HISTORY OF REGULATING LEGAL SERVICES MARKETING
Today's patchwork of ethics rules governing lawyer advertis-
ing, solicitation, and marketing is partly the result of measured
design at the state level and partly historical accident.
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, the marketing of legal
services in America was a function of supply and demand, with
limited regulatory intervention. 2 Many lawyers in the Colonial
Period received their educations in England, where lawyers were
12. LOUISE L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 40-41 (1993).
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trained and admitted to practice through the Inns of Court. 3 The
colonial lawyers were an exclusive group who valued etiquette,
decorum, and collegiality. 4 Common training and the fact that
there were a limited number of lawyers to attend to the business
of a new nation obviated the need for marketing."
However, as the demand for legal services expanded beyond
the American aristocracy and the nation extended into the fron-
tier, more lawyers were needed. The standards necessary to prac-
tice law decreased, giving rise to the prairie lawyer. 6 Since many
of these lawyers were self-taught, the primary standard for ad-
mission to practice became good moral character. 7 Relaxed ad-
mission standards and increased public demand led to a substan-
tial growth of the legal profession in America. 8 In 1850, there
were approximately 22,000 lawyers in the United States. 9 This
number tripled in the next thirty years and stood at about
114,000 by the turn of the Twentieth Century.20
This growth led to competition that, in turn, led to various
forms of advertising and solicitation by lawyers. Legal services
were advertised in the classified sections of newspapers, which, in
that era, commonly appeared on the front pages.2' Lawyers ad-
vertised alongside businesses such as insurance companies, ship-
pers, surveyors, and others involved in the development of the
new nation.22 Although the art of advertising was not well-
13. Id.; see also HENRY SANDWITH DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210-11 (1953).
14. See AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 48-50; HILL, supra note 12, at 40.
It appears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and
not as a rule of ethics. Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a
form of public service, rather than as a means of earning a living, and they
looked down on "trade" as unseemly.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977) (citing DRINKER, supra note 13, at
210-11).
15. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 29; see DRINKER, supra note 13, at 210-12; HILL,
supra note 12, at 40.
16. See CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 29-30 ("Lawyers were viewed as guardians of
the American aristocracy. The public saw this as an 'undemocratic' situation. Conse-
quently, states began to redefine admission requirements and encourage entry into the
profession with new standards .... ").
17. See DRINKER, supra note 13, at 19-21.
18. HILL, supra note 12, at 41.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 31.
22. Id. at 30; see also William L. Wheeler, Lawyer Aduertising: The Way it Was in the
Good Old Days, 67 ILL. B.J. 90, 90-93, 137 (1978) (discussing techniques used for the
[Vol. 36:49
AD RULES INFINITUM
developed and many of today's media did not exist, lawyers took
advantage of the methods that were available. Handbills, busi-
ness cards and notices in city directories were used to provide in-
formation about the services lawyers provided.'
Occasionally, law firms went beyond merely providing informa-
tion and used persuasive techniques. In the late 1800s, a Wash-
ington, D.C., law firm distributed a forty-eight-page brochure en-
titled "Information and Advice Relating to Patents, Caveats,
Trademarks and Copyrights."' The brochure included photo-
graphs of the firm's office and partners and quoted Abraham Lin-
coln on the cover." Other brochures included client testimonials
about the service they had received.
Perhaps the most notable lawyer to advertise in the Nineteenth
Century was Abraham Lincoln. His various partnerships ran
classified newspaperin the 1830s and the 1850s." One biographer
suggests that Lincoln was probably not directly involved in these
ads and may not have known about them in advance.28 However,
Lincoln is reported to have sent letters to railroad companies, the
wealthiest and most prestigious business in central Illinois at
that time, soliciting their business during his years of practice.29
In the latter part of the Nineteenth Century, the legal profes-
sion advanced a series of measures to limit its ranks and secure
its position as a monopoly in America. It developed a system of
formal education, eventually requiring that a lawyer graduate
marketing of legal services in the Nineteenth Century).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 90.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 92-93.
27. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 31-32; see, e.g., LORI B. ANDREwS, BIRTH OF A
SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 1 (rev. ed. 1981).
Lincoln's image is sometimes invoked as a model for lawyer advertising,
with his advertising having been the feature of at least one recent television
campaign for legal services. Other times, he, obviously, is advanced as the
highest example of professionalism. He is probably an excellent illustration of
the ability of a lawyer in that era to combine aspects of commercialism, com-
petence and dignity in the practice of law.
CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 31-32.
28. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 70-74, 145 (1995).
29. Id. at 155. Ironically, Lincoln lived and worked in New Salem, Illinois, which be-
came a ghost town after the railroad failed to locate near there, deciding instead to run
through Springfield, Illinois. See id. at 38-43, 154-57.
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from law school before being admitted to the bar.3" The profession
created the bar examination to test competence.3' It developed a
system of ethics and discipline, requiring lawyers to adhere to
standards of conduct.32 Failure to do so led to disbarment.33
Within this code, lawyers were prohibited from soliciting busi-
ness, advertising, or going into business with those who were not
lawyers.34 The legal profession also advanced a series of state
laws prohibiting non-lawyers from practicing law."
Ethics codes originated as individual hortatory measures de-
signed to advance moral principles among lawyers.36 The Ala-
bama State Bar Association was the first state bar to establish an
enforceable set of ethics in 1887.3' The code banned targeted so-
licitations, but permitted common forms of advertising.3" It stated
that "newspaper advertisements, circulars and business cards,
tending professional services to the general public, are proper;
but special solicitation of particular individuals to become clients
ought to be avoided."39
30. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 531, 547 (1994).
31. Id.
32. See id. at 544.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. The full range of the profession's methods of controlling the supply of legal
services included:
(1) direct regulation of access to the profession (admission requirements such
as legal education, bar examination, and character-and-fitness scrutiny); (2)
the prohibition on the practice of law by non-lawyers (unauthorized practice);
(3) restraints on the flow of information about legal services (restrictions on
lawyer advertising and solicitation of legal business); (4) restrictions on the
form of delivery, such as limitations on group legal services, non-lawyer par-
ticipation in or ownership of law firms, and dual practice restrictions; and, fi-
nally, (5) a variety of particularized regulations such as the local admission
and local counsel requirements that restricted multistate practice by licensed
attorneys and the prohibition of many forms of pro bono practice by lawyers
who were federal employees.
Id.; see also AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 74-129.
36. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 33 (crediting the first ethics codes to DAVID HOFF-
MAN, RESOLUTION IN REGARD TO PROFESSIONAL DEPARTMENT (1846) and GEORGE SHARS-
WOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854)). The ABA Canons drew heavily on
Sharswood's essay. AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 41. For representative examples of Shars-
wood's propositions, see SHARSWOOD, supra, at 55-61.
37. HILL, supra note 12, at 42.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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The American Bar Association adopted its first set of ethics,
entitled the Canons of Ethics, in 1908.40 Although many of the
provisions were adapted from the Alabama Code, the Canons
banned solicitation and certain forms of lawyer advertising which
had been permitted under the Alabama Code.4' In its condemna-
tion, Canon 27 stated: "The most worthy and effective advertise-
ment possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his
brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust."4 2 The Canons ex-
plicitly banned "circular advertisements, personal communica-
tions and indirect advertisement, whether by allied business or
inspired newspaper comment."43 Business cards were permitted,
except for use in advertising or solicitation."
According to the 1995 ABA report, Lawyer Advertising at the
Crossroads, these restrictions appear to have served only the in-
terest of the profession to preserve its size and demographics, and
advance the establishment of its monopoly.45 The report states
that "[historical accounts fail to indicate that the restrictions
were in any way the consequences of overreaching or that the
public was harmed by lawyer advertising."46
For nearly seventy years, these prohibitions on legal services
marketing were stringently enforced. For example, in 1929, a
lawyer placed a small classified ad in a San Francisco newspaper
stating, "D. Barton, Advice free; all cases, all courts. Open eves'
followed by his address.47 The State Bar of California recom-
mended that the lawyer be suspended from practice for three
months as a result of this advertisement offering free advice.48
While the Supreme Court of California found the punishment too
40. ABA CANONS OF ETHIcs (1908); see also CTR. FOR PROFL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA,
COMPENDIUM OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY RULEs AND STANDARDS 313 (2001) [hereinafter
COMPENDIM].
41. HILL, supra note 12, at 41.
42. ABA CANONS OFETHICS Canon 27 (1908).
43. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 33.
44. Id. Canon 27 was amended by the ABA in 1943 to authorize biographical informa-
tion in approved law lists. COMiPENDIUrM, supra note 40, at 322. Canon 27 was amended in
1951 to permit lawyers to designate practice areas of admiralty, patent, and trademark on
letterhead, office signage, and business cards. Id at 322-23.
45. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 33.
46. Id.
47. Barton v. State Bar, 289 P. 818, 818 (Cal. 1930) (per curiam).
48. Id.
20021
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severe and reduced it to a public reprimand, it clearly condemned
the action, stating that, "[iut can readily be understood how unfa-
vorably the public would react toward the profession as a whole if
there were published large full-pageextolling the learning, ability,
and capacity of an attorney 'to get results."49
The Canons' prohibitions went far beyond limited notions of
lawyer advertising. Lawyers were sanctioned for various endeav-
ors deemed to constitute unethical marketing. For example, law-
yers were suspended for their involvement in articles that dis-
cussed their practices and successes.' ° In 1963, partners of a well-
established New York City law firm were publicly censured for al-
lowing Life magazine to publish an article on their practice, even
though the original intent of the article was to profile a series of
law firms." Hiring public relations firms, soliciting speaking en-
gagements, and holding press conferences were deemed to be in
violation of the ethics provisions.52
Also in 1963, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 309, indicating
that it was improper marketing for a lawyer to send Christmas
cards to clients or other lawyers unless there was a personal rela-
tionship.53 Cards could not identify law firms or be signed in a
way that indicated the sender was a lawyer. 4 The opinion did,
however, deem it appropriate for cards to include legal symbols in
a holiday context.55
In 1969, the ABA revamped its ethics rules and replaced the
Canons with the Model Code, which was then adopted by the vast
majority of states.56 The Model Code incorporated the advertising
and solicitation prohibitions of Canons 27 and 28 into new
49. Id. at 820.
50. See Bushman v. State Bar, 522 P.2d 312, 316-19 (Cal. 1974); In re Tall, 93 S.W.2d
922, 922-23 (Mo. 1936); In re Axtell, 242 N.Y.S. 18, 31-33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930), modified,
257 N.Y.S. 470, 471-74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932).
51. In re Connelly, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126, 132-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (per curiam).
52. See N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 423 (1953).
53. ABA Comm'n on Profl Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 309 (1963).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. COMPENDIUM, supra note 40, at 157.
[Vol. 36:49
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Canon 2. These provisions were amended in 1974 and 1975 to
permit advertising in limited contexts. 5
By the 1970s, the need for affordable legal services to individu-
als had become apparent and well-documented. The American
Bar Foundation and the ABA Special Committee to Survey Legal
Needs issued a report, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final
Report of a National Survey, that identified the extent to which
people faced legal problems without the use of lawyers.59 The re-
port indicated that those who were minorities, younger, less edu-
cated, or less affluent were least likely to find lawyers who were
ready, willing, and able to handle their legal matters.6 °
Relying in part on this report and advancing the newly-
established doctrine of commercial free speech, a divided United
States Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,6 held
that the state lacked the constitutional right to ban lawyers from
advertising.62 In Bates, the Court methodically negated the ar-
guments set forth to retain the ban on lawyer advertising. While
the Court held a ban unconstitutional, it also indicated that the
states had the obligation to govern lawyer advertising in order to
protect the interests of the public.' In its conclusion, the Court
stated that "[in sum, we recognize that many of the problems in
defining the boundary between deceptive and nondeceptive ad-
vertising remain to be resolved, and we expect that the bar will
have a special role to play in assuring that advertising by attor-
neys flows both freely and cleanly."65
57. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSmiLTY EC 2-8 to 2-15, DR 2-101 to 2-103 (1969);
see also CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 35.
58. WILLIAM E. HORNSBY, JR., MARKETING AND LEGAL ETHICS: THE BOUNDARIES OF
PROMOTING LEGAL SERVICES 15 (3d ed. 2000).
59. BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A
NATIONAL SURVEY (1977).
60. Id. at 214.
It is also clear from the data that the types of problems taken to lawyers by
such subgroups of users as blacks/latinos, younger persons, the under-
educated, or the less affluent are more likely to result in situations in which
the lawyer consulted will not handle the Case, does not complete work on it,
or is unable to achieve the desired results ....
Id.
61. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
62. Id. at 379-81.
63. See id. at 359-82.
64. Id. at 383-84.
65. Id. at 384.
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Although the ethics provisions of every state became unconsti-
tutional overnight, the organized bar had anticipated the outcome
of the Bates decision.66 The ABA had conducted a conference in
1975 specifically aimed at addressing issues of lawyer advertis-
ing.6" In addition, just prior to the Bates decision in 1977, the
ABA had established a task force on lawyer advertising.68 Within
the six weeks between the Court's decision and the ABA's 1977
Annual Meeting, this task force drafted changes to the Model
Code that were designed to comply with the Court's action.69 The
task force offered two alternative versions, one of which was
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates that August.70
Governing the parameters of lawyer advertising and legal ser-
vices marketing was difficult, however, because of the limited di-
rection found in the Bates decision. The Court made clear that
false and misleading communications were not forms of protected
speech.7' The Court, however, indicated that the issue decided in
Bates was a narrow one when it stated that "[t]he heart of the
dispute before us today is whether lawyers also may constitution-
ally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be
performed."72 The Court said that it would not decide the issues
having to do with the quality of legal services or with the solicita-
tion of legal services. 7' Furthermore, the case centered on a print
advertisement that had been published in a newspaper.74 There-
fore, policy-makers had to grapple with a series of questions. To
what extent could potential misrepresentations be limited? Could
the states continue to ban solicitation? Was the decision limited
to routine legal services? Was it limited to print media? Could
66. See CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 37.
67. Id. The conference was designed to "inform the leaders of the bar and the profes-
sion about the issues that would be raised by advertising, and the effect that advertising
would have on lawyers and the general public, and to motivate further consideration and
discussion among state and local bar leaders." Id. (quoting Memorandum from Lawrence
E. Walsh, ABA President, to the ABA Conference on Lawyer Advertising (Nov. 14, 1975)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. , 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
72. Id. at 367-68.
73. Id. at 366.
74. See id. at 384 ("The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may
prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement concerning
the availability and terms of routine legal services.").
[Vol. 36:49
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states ban advertising through electronic media or direct mail ad
campaigns?
In fact, the standard for assessing the constitutionality of
commercial speech would not be set forth by the Court for three
more years. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission,5 a case unrelated to lawyer advertising, the
Court clearly and succinctly set out the governing test:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has devel-
oped. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.
76
Even with the direction supplied by the Court in Central Hud-
son, the organized bar was left with a great deal of guesswork as
it carried out its obligation to regulate the communications of
commercial speech among lawyers." Lawyers had been taught for
nearly seventy years that lawyer advertising was wrong.7 s Ad-
vancing notions of professionalism and showing disdain for com-
petition, they embraced a cultural bias against self-promotion. 9
This bias provided the support for restrictive provisions that re-
peatedly failed to pass constitutional scrutiny." For example, in
1982, the United States Supreme Court held that states could not
restrict the identification of practice areas and the circulation of
announcements of office openings if the information was merely
potentially misleading.81 In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
75. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
76. Id. at 566.
77. See CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 16-26 (discussing the United States Supreme
Court's analysis of lawyer advertising following the Central Hudson decision).
78. See id. at 1-2 (noting that the ABA's 1908 ban on lawyer advertising remained in
place until 1977).
79. Cramton, supra note 30 at 607. For an analysis of the professional milieu explor-
ing the relationship between public service and commercialism, see BARLOw F. CHRISTEN-
SEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS: SOME PROBLEMS OF AVALABIUTY OF
LEGAL SERVICES 151-72 (1970).
80. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 15.
81. In re R.J.M., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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Counsel,2 the Court found that states could not ban illustrations
that provided accurate information, even if the state deemed
them undignified.13 In this 1985 decision, the Court stated that
"the mere possibility that some members of the population might
find advertising embarrassing or offensive cannot justify sup-
pressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some
members of the bar might find beneath their dignity."'
Each miscalculation led to the need for the states to change
their ethics rules in order to bring them into conformity with the
Court's holdings.85 Then, in 1983, a wildcard further disrupted
any possibility of creating unity among the states in the regula-
tion of legal services marketing.86
Even though case law required the ABA to change its model
provisions, the Association encouraged the states to adopt these
changes and to bring their ethics rules in line with the Court's
ruling in Bates and its progeny. While the states were in the
process of considering the changes, however, the ABA advanced
an initiative that led to a completely revamped set of ethics gov-
erning the legal profession.8" In 1983, the Model Rules substan-
tially changed the overall format and substance of many rules set
forth in the Model Code, including those addressing lawyer ad-
vertising and marketing.8 9
82. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
83. Id. at 648.
84. Id.
85. See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT vii, viii (2000) ("Nineteen amendments
have been made to the Rules and Comments since their initial promulgation in 1983. A
synopsis of these amendments, most of which, with the notable exception of those dealing
with lawyer advertising, have been minor, is included as an appendix to this volume.").
86. See Robert W. Meserve, Introduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT I, 1-3
(2000) (noting that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the ABA's
House of Delegates on August 2, 1983).
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Model Code included ethics considerations ("ECs"), which were guidelines
providing unsanctioned directions to lawyers, and disciplinary rules ("DRs"), setting the
floor of acceptable behavior. Failure to adhere to the provisions of the DRs could lead to
disciplinary action and result in sanctions against the lawyer. The Model Rules eliminated
the ECs and provided only sanctionable rules, along with explanatory comments. Id.
[Vol. 36:49
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In the eighteen years since the ABA adopted the Model Rules,
forty-three states have adopted versions of the Rules.9" Other
states have retained the Model Code9' and a few have incorpo-
rated the substance of the Model Rules into the format of the
Model Code.92
While states were in the process of considering their policies to
govern legal services marketing shortly after the adoption of the
Model Rules, the ABA Commission on Advertising held hearings
in 1986 to determine whether the Model Rules sufficiently met
the needs of the profession and the public.93 The Commission con-
cluded that advertising could assist lawyers in building a client
base, especially to serve low- and moderate-level income people
with their personal legal needs.94 The Commission also reported,
however, that many lawyers, and in particular, bar leaders, con-
sidered advertising to be inappropriate self-promotion "undermin-
ing the integrity of the profession and weakening the public's im-
age of lawyers in general and the legal system."95
Even though some lawyers held strong sentiments to advance
ethics provisions more restrictive than those found in the Model
Rules, the litany of United States Supreme Court cases striking
down restrictions, combined with the prospects of antitrust viola-
tions against the ABA stemming from the Federal Trade Com-
mission (the "FTC"),9" led the ABA Commission on Advertising to
conclude that restrictions would not be a viable long-term solu-
tion to the concerns expressed by the leadership of the organized
bar.97 As an alternative, the ABA Commission promulgated a set
of aspirational goals exhorting lawyers who chose to advertise to
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT vii, viii (2000).
9L See, e.g., N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (Consol. Cum. Supp. 2000); Omo
CODE OF PROFL RESPONSIBILITY (2001).
92. See, e.g., NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2001); OR. CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY (2001).
93. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 38-39.
94. See Practice Guide: ABA Aspirational Goals for Lawyer Advertising, 2 Laws. Man.
on Prof1 Conduct (ABA/BNA) 81:201, at 81:207-09 (July 18, 1990) [hereinafter Practice
Guide].
95. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 38.
96. STAFF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SUBMISSION OF THE STAFF OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COM.ISSION TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMISSION ON ADVER-
TISING 2 (June 24, 1994) [hereinafter FTC SUBlI.SSION] (referencing correspondence from
the FTC staff to ABA Commission on Advertising Chair, Thomas S. Johnson, on December
8, 1986).
97. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 37-38.
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do so in ways that recognized the need to honor the legal profes-
sion.9" The goals were adopted by the ABA in 1988."9
At the same time, some states were dissatisfied with the scope
of limitations set out in the Model Rules. Bar leaders in these
states began the process of considering options. In 1990, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court adopted a set of rules set out by the Florida
Bar which imposed a series of restrictions on lawyer advertising
and marketing far greater than those found in the Model Rules.0 0
Although set out in the format of the Model Rules, the specific
provisions included a number of limitations not found in the ABA
model. These included prohibitions of testimonials,' dramatiza-
tions,0 2 and lyrics.0 3 The Florida rules required a series of dis-
claimers and disclosures under various circumstances, including
the statement: "The hiring of a lawyer is an important decision
that should not be based solely upon advertisements. Before you
decide, ask us to send you free written information about our
qualifications and experience."' 4 The Florida rules also unilater-
ally prohibited lawyers from sending direct mail solicitations for
personal injury or wrongful death matters within thirty days of
the date giving rise to the need for legal services.' In addition,
the Florida rules imposed a screening system that required law-
yers to submit their ads to the state for review to determine
whether they complied with the rules.' 6
After Florida adopted its revised rules, several states initiated
their own examinations of the provisions of their ethics rules gov-
erning legal services marketing. While no state adopted the Flor-
ida rules verbatim, several adopted various provisions that were
not otherwise included in the Model Rules.'0 7 For example,
98. Practice Guide, supra note 94, at 81:207.
99. Id. at 81:207-09. The Aspirational Goals continue to be policy of the ABA and are
posted at http://abanet.org/legalservices/advabaaspirgoals.html (last modified Jan. 31,
2001).
100. The rules adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in 1990 have since been modi-
fied. Those portions of the Florida Rules adopted in 1990 addressing the communications
of legal services are included in CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 182-91.
101. FLORIDA RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 4-7.1(d) (effective January 1, 1991).
102. Id. R. 4-7.2(e).
103. Id.
104. Id. R. 4-7.2(d).
105. Id. R. 4-7.4(b)(1)(A).
106. See id. R. 4-7.5.
107. See William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising:
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Texas 8 and New Mexico.. 9 adopted rules requiring the submis-
sion and screening of advertisements. Nevada adopted most of
the Florida rules, but rejected the screening requirement, con-
cluding that it would prove too burdensome and costly."' The
process of review and reconsideration led some states to adopt
rules completely independent of those adopted in Florida."' For
example, Arizona adopted a rule that requires lawyer advertising
to be "predominantly informational.""'
The transition from uniform state condemnation of lawyer ad-
vertising to the current situation, in which the state may regu-
late, but not prohibit, the communication of legal services, has
not been an easy one. As a result of the limited direction pro-
vided by the United States Supreme Court,"' the cultural bias of
the legal profession, the shift from the Model Code to the Model
Rules,"4 the reluctance of the ABA to strengthen its rules, and
the dissatisfaction of the states with those Model Rules provi-
sions, no state has adopted the provisions of the Model Rules gov-
erning the communications of legal services verbatim, and no two
states have identical sets of rules governing the commercial
speech of lawyers."5
Public Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 327-
28 (1996).
The rules adopted in Florida in 1990 governing lawyer advertising, solicita-
tion and marketing sparked a renaissance among the states, which imposed
restrictions designed to limit lawyer advertising in general and sensational-
ism in particular. Nevada, New Mexico and Texas followed Florida in the
adoption of restrictive rules.... Pennsylvania, Arizona, California, Ohio,
South Dakota and Louisiana also adopted rules creating greater restrictions.
Id.
108. TEx. STATE BAR R. art. X, §9, R 7.05-07.
109. N.M. R. 16-702.
110. NEv. Sup. CT. R. 196.
111. Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 107, at 327-28.
112. ARiz. Sup. CT. R. ER 7.1.
113. See CTR. FOR PROF1L RESPONSIBILITY & HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ABA, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 498 [hereinafler ANNOTATED MODEL RULES] (summa-
rizing United States Supreme Court cases concerning First Amendment considerations).
114. See Meserve, supra note 86, at 1-2.
115. See discussion infra Part IHI.
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III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF STATE RULES GOVERNING LEGAL
SERVICES MARKETING
The rules of most states have common elements and frequently
include identical provisions." 6 Differences among the states
might not necessarily lead to overwhelming obstacles for multi-
state law firm compliance. However, various state rules go to, or
perhaps beyond, the constitutional edge of permissible restric-
tions on commercial free speech through, for example, the adop-
tion of expansive definitions of false or misleading representa-
tions.1 7  States frequently embrace provisions that are
inconsistent with marketing techniques that would advance the
flow of legal commerce when, for example, they require cumber-
some disclaimers." 8 States tend to stress the regulation of differ-
ent methods of marketing." 9 For example, some jurisdictions im-
pose restrictions specifically addressing the electronic media,
which are designed to govern television advertising,2 ° while oth-
ers focus on the regulation of direct mail solicitations.' 2' The
scope of the application of the rules, however, may be widening as
states explore their rights to control lawyers admitted in other ju-
risdictions.'22 When combined, these factors may tilt the balance
between consumer protection and legal services marketing in
ways that are detrimental to both the public and the law firm.
In both Bates and Central Hudson, the United States Supreme
Court clearly established the right of the state to prohibit com-
mercial speech that is false or misleading.'23 This limitation has
been a cornerstone of the regulation of lawyer advertising since
the Bates decision. The current ABA Model Rules set out four
standards for determining whether a communication is false or
misleading. 24 First, the communication cannot contain a material
116. See HORNSBY, supra note 58, at 17 ("Most states have adopted Model Rule 7.1 ei-
ther verbatim or with additions or minor modifications.").
117. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 156-90 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 170-90 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
123. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2000).
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misrepresentation of fact or law.'25 This is fundamentally the ba-
sis for consumer protection statutes. Second, the communication
must not omit a fact necessary to make a statement nondecep-
tive.126 Third, a communication is false or misleading if it is likely
to create an unjustified expectation about the results the lawyer
can achieve. 27 This standard assumes that each legal matter is
unique and one should not rely on prior experiences of past cli-
ents to assess the outcome of his or her particular legal issue. 28
This rule is commonly interpreted to limit client testimonials that
would lead prospective clients to believe that they would obtain a
similar outcome. 129 Finally, the communication must not compare
the lawyer's services to those of other lawyers, unless the com-
parison can be factually substantiated.3 ° This provision prohibits
the sort of puffery such as when a lawyer characterizes his or her
services as being better than those of another. 3'
These provisions regulating the marketing of legal services are
far more strict than limitations in other commercial settings
where testimonials and puffery are not uncommon. 32 These rules
have never been constitutionally challenged in specific applica-
tions and, thus, the courts have never given direction on what is
within the parameter of false or misleading. In Bates, the United
States Supreme Court clearly indicated that the restrictions
placed on lawyer advertising could be greater than that for busi-
nesses or products. 3 The Court stated: "In fact, because the pub-
lic lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements
that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other adver-
tising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising."'
Thus far, the states have been free to set boundaries of communi-
cations that they deem misleading and therefore impermissible.
125. Id. R. 7.1(a).
126. Id.
127. Id. R. 7.1(b).
128. Id. R. 7.1 cmt. 1.
129. Id.
130. Id. R. 7.1(c).
131. Id.
132. See FTC SUBInISSION, supra note 96, at 3-4.
133. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
134. Id.
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While most states have adopted the four provisions of the ABA
Model Rules governing false or misleading communications, sev-
eral jurisdictions have adopted additional provisions.135 In par-
ticular, a series of states have ethics rules that prohibit testimo-
nials, deeming them inherently false or misleading.136 While the
commentary to the Model Rules provides justification that a tes-
timonial is potentially misleading when it creates an unjustified
expectation about the outcome of a matter, a rule that declares
that a testimonial is false or misleading does not consider the
possibility that the substance of the testimonial could address an
attribute of the lawyer, the firm, or the services provided other
than the outcome.'37 In other words, a testimonial could speak to
the values of the firm or the responsiveness of the lawyer, neither
of which give rise to an expectation of outcome. 3 ' These types of
testimonials have been termed "soft endorsements."'39
The 1994 Submission of the Staff of the FTC to the ABA Com-
mission on Advertising commented on this issue when it stated:
To be sure, testimonials and endorsements can be used in ways that
mislead about likely outcomes, and it may be both appropriate and
necessary to take action against those that do. But some aspects of
professional services, unrelated to particular outcomes, might well
be communicated truthfully and usefully by a report of a client's ac-
tual experience. Rather than a conclusive ban, an approach might be
taken similar to that of the [FTC] Commission's guides on this sub-
ject, that seeks to ensure that client testimonials are truthful and
not misleading. 4 °
While testimonials are the most common examples of the
states' expansive definitions of false or misleading communica-
tions, the rules of South Dakota serve to illustrate the extent to
which a state reaches to define what it deems false or mislead-
ing.' Instead of the four types of communications considered
false or misleading within the Model Rules, Rule 7.1(c) of the
South Dakota Rules of Professional Responsibility lists seventeen
135. HORNSBY, supra note 58, at 24-25.
136. Id. States that deem testimonials false or misleading include Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming. Id.
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 1 (2000).
138. Id.
139. Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Profl and Guidance Comm., Op. 91-17 (1992).
140. FTC SUBMISSION, supra note 96, at 12.
141. See S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c)(1)-(17).
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communications that the state deems false or misleading. 42
While these provisions will no doubt preventthat may be false or
misleading, the extent of the list raises the question of the con-
stitutional right of a state to define that which is false or mis-
leading. Simply put, under the Central Hudson test, can a state,
constitutionally, decree any aspect of commercial speech to be
false or misleading and therefore prohibit it?
In Bates, the Court suggested that, as an alternative to bans,
less restrictive methods of controlling lawyer advertising, such as
disclaimers, might be appropriate.'" States have accepted the in-
vitation and employed this methodology widely.
State ethics rules may require disclaimers in virtually all ad-
vertising, in all advertising except under defined safe harbor pro-
visions, or only under certain circumstances. For example, Iowa
requires lawyers who advertise under its rules to include the
statement: 'The determination of the need for legal services and
the choice of a lawyer are extremely important decisions and
should not be based solely uponor self-proclaimed expertise. This
disclosure is required by rule of the Supreme Court of Iowa."'"
As discussed in Part II, Florida requires a similar disclaimer
for print ads, which states: "The hiring of a lawyer is an impor-
tant decision that should not be based solely upon advertise-
ments. Before you decide, ask us to send you free written infor-
mation about our qualifications and experience."'45 However, the
disclaimer is not required if the content of the ad is limited to cer-
tain information that is otherwise set forth in the Florida rules. 46
These safe harbor provisions include information such as date of
admission, foreign language capabilities, and acceptance of credit
cards. 47
In other instances, the requirement to include a disclaimer is
predicated on the content of the ad. Most frequently, ads for con-
142. Id.
143. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) ("We do not foreclose the pos-
sibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like,
might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure
that the consumer is not misled.").
144. IOWA CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILrrY FOR LAWYERS DR 2-101(A) (2001).
145. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.3(b).
146. Id.
147. Id. R. 4-7.2(c)(10).
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tingency fee cases stating that if there is no recovery, there is no
fee, are required to also inform the potential client of his or her
possible liability for costs.' 48
Lawyers who advertise their fields of practice sometimes have
obligations to include disclaimers involving certification of spe-
cialties. For example, Texas requires lawyers to disclose in
theirthat they are not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Spe-
cialization if the lawyer advertises for services in fields of practice
that are those in which the state certifies lawyers and the lawyer
is not, in fact, certified as a specialist in Texas in that field.
149
Law firms must include this disclosure if any members of the firm
are not certified.' 50
On the other hand, Illinois, like most states, has no mechanism
to certify lawyers as specialists.' 5 ' When a lawyer is certified by
another state or an independent entity, such as the National
Board of Trial Advocacy, and the lawyer communicates that certi-
fication in Illinois, the lawyer must include a disclaimer stating
that "the Supreme Court of Illinois does not recognize certifica-
tions of specialties in the practice of law and that the certificate,
award or recognition is not a requirement to practice law in Ili-
* 152nois.
In some media, the requirement to include multiple disclaimers
may not be particularly intrusive in light of the nature of the me-
dia. For example, the Internet facilitates the conveyance of any
reasonable amount of information with limited interference with
the main message.153 Other disclaimer requirements are more on-
erous in certain media. For example, an Illinois rule governing
advertising of certification would be difficult to include on a busi-
ness card, the medium through which a lawyer may typically
148. See, e.g., KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130, R. 7.04; MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(e)
("An advertisement or communication indicating that no fee will be charged in the absence
of a recovery shall also disclose whether the client will be liable for any expenses.").
149. TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9, R. 7.04(b)(3).
150. Id.
151. ILL. SUP. CT. R. art. VIII, R. 7.4(b).
152. Id. R. 7.4(c)(2).
153. See, for example, the Internet Web site of the Clausen Miller law firm, at
http://www.clausen.com/disclaimer.asp (last modified Sept. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Clausen
Miller Web site], where the firm includes twenty-seven disclaimers in a scrolled window
that is accessible from the firm's home page.
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communicate his or her certification status.' On this point, the
FTC's staff has stated:
Disclaimer and other disclosure obligations, which many jurisdic-
tions require, tend to increase advertising costs, by requiring that
messages be longer or by forcing advertisers to displace other infor-
mation. Disclosure obligations may also discourage advertising if ad-
vertisers believe consumers will take the disclosure to reflect nega-
tively on the advertiser, regardless of whether that imputation is
justified. Because of these effects, disclosure requirements that are
unnecessary can reduce the amount of useful information available
to consumers. Disclosures and disclaimers can sometimes be neces-
sary to prevent deception. It is important in evaluating disclosure
requirements to weigh the costs against the expected benefits.155
It would be unfortunate for lawyers who are certified as special-
ists by bona fide organizations to refrain from communicating
that fact because of apprehension that consumers might take the
disclaimer negatively.
While the great majority of states embrace aspects of the Model
Rules governing the communications of legal services, they also
typically add provisions that focus on areas of specific concern to
their particular state. Frequently, limitations are imposed on
types of media, in particular television and direct mail solicita-
tions.'56
The Bates Court invited states to specifically address issues in-
herent in television advertising by stating that "the special prob-
lems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will war-
rant special consideration."'57 Since the Bates decision addressed
print advertising, some assumed that it would remain permissi-
ble to ban television advertising for legal services. The ABA's re-
vision of the Model Code following Bates did not permit television
advertising but was revised the following year to do so.' Model
154. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. art. VIfi, R. 7.4(c)(2).
155. FTC SUBMISSION, supra note 96, at 12.
156. See HORNSBY, supra note 58, at 38-42, 61-68.
157. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
158. See TASK FORCE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING, ABA, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOV-
ERNORS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER ADVERTISING 1, 3, reprinted in LORI B. ANDREWS,
BIRTH OF A SALESMiAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLIcITATION 91, 93 (rev. ed. 1981)
("Neither proposal would allow one-to-one solicitation, nor would either now permit the
use of television in the absence of a determination by the appropriate state authorities
that is necessary to provide adequate information to consumers of legal services." (citation
omitted)).
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Rule 7.2 includes a comment that suggests the importance of con-
veying information through television advertising.'59 That com-
ment states that "[t]elevision is now one of the most powerful me-
dia for getting information to the public, particularly persons of
low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising,
therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal ser-
vices to many sectors of the public." 6 °
State rules which focus on television advertising are designed
to permit this flow of information while avoiding inappropriate
persuasion. For example, a New Jersey rule requiring television
advertising for legal services to be primarily informational 6' was
upheld, with the Supreme Court of New Jersey stating: "As the
record before us and the general literature abundantly prove, the
emotional impact of television advertising, in its ability to per-
suade subliminally, through symbols, music, drama, authority
figures-the entire host of emotive non-rational techniques-far
exceeds that of the print media and radio."'62
Article 9 of the California Business and Professions Code sin-
gles out electronic media, requiring that the message as a whole
be factually substantiated. 163  Florida, Iowa, and Wyoming are
among the other states that single out provisions governing tele-
vision advertising for legal services. Iowa requires that the infor-
mation be articulated "only by a single nondramatic voice...
with.., no visual display... except that allowed in print as ar-
ticulated by the announcer."1 64 Among its restrictions on televi-
sion advertising, Wyoming requires:
The information shall be articulated by a voice, with no background
sound or other instrumental music. The voice shall not be that of a
celebrity whose voice is recognizable by the public. If a person ap-
pears as a lawyer in an advertisement for legal services, or under
such circumstance as may give the impression that the person is a
lawyer, such person must be a member of the Wyoming State Bar,
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 cmt. 3 (2000).
160. Id.
161. N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a) ("Allshall be predominantly informa-
tional. No drawings, animations, dramatizations, music, or lyrics shall be used in connec-
tion with televised advertising.").
162. In re Petition of Felmeister & Issacs, 518 A.2d 188, 201 (N.J. 1986).
163. CAL. BUS. & PROFS. CODE § 6158.3 (West Supp. 2001).
164. IOWA CODE PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAwYERS DR 2-101(B)(5) (2001).
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admitted to practice and in good standing before the Wyoming Su-
preme Court and must be the lawyer who will actually perform the
service advertised or a lawyer associated with the law firm which is
advertising.
5
Florida dedicates a separate rule to advertising in the elec-
tronic media. 6 6 For both radio and television, the information:
[Sihall be articulated by a single human voice, or on-screen text,
with no background sound other than instrumental music.... Visual
images appearing in a television advertisement shall be limited to
the advertising lawyer in front of a background consisting of a single
solid color, a set of law books in an unadorned bookcase, or the law-
yer's own office (with no other office personnel shown).
167
In an interesting and unusual conflict between two states' rules
of ethics, Iowa prohibits the voice in an electronic advertisement
to be that of the lawyer,16 while Florida prohibits the voice to be
that of anyone other than that of a lawyer who is a member of the
firm whose services are advertised.
169
Direct mail solicitations are also singled out for widely dispa-
rate and restrictive treatment among the states as they govern
the communications of legal services. Direct mail is regulated in
some combination of three ways. First, Model Rule 7.3(c) and the
rules of virtually every jurisdiction require direct mail to be la-
beled as advertising material under certain circumstances. 7° Sec-
ond, Model Rule 7.3(b) and the rules of most states require law-
yers to refrain from sending direct mail solicitations to people
under various circumstances.' 7' This Model Rule prohibits law-
yers from sending written solicitations when "(1) the prospective
client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited
by the lawyer; or (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or
harassment."7 2 Third, some states have followed Florida by
adopting a bright line rule that prohibits lawyers from sending
solicitations to prospective clients for personal injury or wrongful
165. Wyo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAw R. 7.2(f).
166. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.5.
167. Id.
168. IOWA CODE PROIfL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 2-101(B)(5) (2001).
169. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.5.
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(c) (2000).
171. Id. R. 7.3(b); see also HORNSBY, supra note 58, at 61-68.
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
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death representation within thirty days of the day that gives rise
to the event creating the cause of action.1 3
The labeling requirement is the source of greatest disparity
among the states. 74 The purpose of the rule is to notify the recipi-
ent that correspondence from a lawyer, which may otherwise be
an extremely important matter, is nothing more than a commer-
cial solicitation, which may be acted upon or discarded according
to the needs of the prospective client.175
A small, but very significant distinction is found between the
states that have adopted the Model Rule and those that have
adopted a more expansive interpretation. Model Rule 7.3(c) re-
quires mail to be labeled "'advertising material'" only if it is going
to "a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a
particular matter." 17 6 Some states such as New Mexico'7 7 and
Georgia, 78 however, require more explicit labeling. New Mexico,
for instance, requires all advertising to be labeled as such unless
it falls into a narrow set of safe harbor provisions. 79 The rule
states: "Inin the form of correspondence, the top of the first page
of the communication and the outside of the communication shall
have printed on it in conspicuous writing the words: ['LAWYER
ADVERTISEMENT']."18 9 Georgia requires labeling for written
communications to those other than close friends, relatives, and
former clients. 8'
Some states require the labeling to be specific colors, specific
sizes, or in specific locations. For example, Arizona Supreme
Court Rule 7.3(b) requires written communications to be labeled:
"'ADVERTISING MATERIAL: THIS IS A COMMERCIAL SO-
LICITATION. 18 2 This notice has to be printed in red ink, in all
capital letters and in a type size at least twice that of the largest
173. HORNSBY, supra note 58, at 64. States with bright line rules include Alabama,
Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Wyoming. Id.
174. See id. at 64-66.
175. See id. at 65-66.
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(c) (2000).
177. N.M. R. 16-701(D).
178. R. & REGULATIONS ORG. & Gov'T STATE BAR GA. 7.3(b).
179. N.M.R. 16-701(D).
180. Id.
181. R. & REGULATIONS ORG. & GOV'T STATE BAR GA. 7.3(b).
182. ARz. SUP. CT. R. ER 7.3(b).
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type size used in the communication.'83 Texas Rule 7.05(b)(2) re-
quires, in some circumstances, that the word "ADVERTISE-
MiENT'" be in a color that contrasts sharply with the background
color of the mailer and be at least 3/8" tall or three times the
height of the letters used in the body of the communication,
whichever is larger."
States frequently have inalterable words or phrases that must
be included as part of these labeling requirements. Nevada re-
quires the statement to read: "NOTICE: THIS IS AN ADVER-
TISEMENT!"'85 For recipients known to need legal services, lVis-
souri requires the statement: "'ADVERTISING MATERIAL:
COMMERICAL SOLICITATIONS ARE PERMITTED BY THE
MISSOURI RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BUT ARE
NEITHER SUBMITTED TO NOR APPROVED BY THE MIS-
SOURI BAR OR THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.
18 6
Beyond labeling requirements, direct mail is an advertising
mechanism that sometimes obliges the lawyer or firm to add dis-
claimers. Florida requires the first sentence of any written com-
munication sent concerning a specific legal matter to state: "'If
you have already retained a lawyer for this matter, please disre-
gard this letter."" 7 Oklahoma requires the lawyer to provide spe-
cific information about how recipients can report abuses.8 The
communication must end with the statement: "'If you find any-
thing in this communication to be inaccurate or misleading, you
may report the same by writing to the General Counsel of the
Oklahoma Bar Association [followed by the address], or by calling
[followed by the telephone number]." 89
South Carolina requires, in addition to simple labeling, the fol-
lowing information for communications sent to those known to be
in need of legal services:
183. Id.
184. See TEX. DIscIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 7.05(b)(2).
185. NEv. SUP. CT. R. 197(3) (requiring it to be in red ink and in legible type at least
twice the size of the largest type in the body of the statement).
186. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4-7.3(a).
187. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-7.4(b)(2)(H).
188. OKLA. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 7.2(c)(1).
189. Id.
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(A) "You may wish to consult your lawyer or another lawyer in-
stead of me (us). You may obtain information about other lawyers by
consulting the Yellow Pages or by calling the South Carolina Bar
Lawyer Referral Service at [telephone number] in Columbia or toll
free [telephone number].... If you have already engaged a lawyer in
connection with the legal matter referred to in this letter, you should
direct any questions you have to that lawyer;" and
(B) "The exact nature of your legal situation will depend on many
facts not known to me (us) at this time. You should understand that
the advice and information in this letter is general and that your
own situation may vary."
3) "ANY COMPLAINTS ABOUT THIS LETTER (OR RE-
CORDING) OR THE REPRESENTATION OF ANY LAWYER MAY
BE DI-RECTED TO THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON
GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE. POST OFFICE BOX [number]
COLUMBIA SOUTH CAROLINA 29211 TELEPHONE NUMBER
[number] .19o
A fundamental aspect of marketing inherent to the notion of
competition is the ability of the service provider to distinguish his
or her services from those of others providing the same or similar
services. As discussed above, Model Rule 7.1 places limits on the
ability of lawyers to make such distinctions, particularly through
the restriction prohibiting lawyers from comparing their services
to those of other lawyers, unless factually substantiated. 19' How-
ever, some states have imposed restrictions that further limit the
ability of lawyers to provide prospective clients with information
that compares their services to other lawyers. Section 6158.3 of
the California Business and Professions Code requires that an
advertisement in an electronic media "disclose the factual and le-
gal circumstances that justify the result portrayed in the mes-
sage,.., or the advertisement must state that the result por-
trayed in the advertisement was dependent on the facts of that
case, and that the results will differ if based on different facts."'92
One of the simplest ethics requirements that undermines no-
tions of marketing is a required disclaimer from Alabama that
states: "No representation is made that the quality of the legal
190. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 7.3(c)(2)-(3).
191. MODEL RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2000).
192. CAL. Bus. & PROFS. CODE § 6158.3 (West Supp. 2001).
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services to be preformed is greater than the quality of legal ser-
vices performed by other lawyers."93
Iowa DR 2-101 expands this concept considerably by stating
that:
A lawyer shall not, on the lawyer's own behalf, or that of a partner,
associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the law-
yer's firm, use, or participate in the use of, any form of public com-
munication which contains any false, fraudulent, misleading, decep-
tive, self-laudatory, or unfair statement, which contains any
statement or claim relating to the quality of the lawyer's legal ser-
vices, which appeals to the emotions, prejudices, likes, or dislikes of
a person, or which contains any claim that is not verifiable
1 94
In its report to the ABA Commission on Advertising, the staff
of the FTC made this observation about these rules:
These restrictions effectively prohibit dramatizations. But dia-
logue and demonstration may be effective ways to explain the law,
particularly to consumers who do not already know how legal termi-
nology corresponds to their experiences and problems. Dramatiza-
tions or illustrations that some consumers-and professionals-view
as tacky or offensive, but are not deceptive, may not offend other
consumers at all, and those who do find them objectionable may reg-
ister their distaste by refusing to patronize the offenders.'
95
Even though the legal profession is regulated on a state-by-
state basis, legal services marketing can clearly be a multi-state
fumction. 9 6 In fact, in some media it is difficult, if not impossible,
to limit the reach of marketing. Printin regional publications,
televisionthat are cablecast, and sites on the Internet are inher-
ently multi-jurisdictional, or in the case of the Internet, a-
jurisdictional.97 The scope of the state's regulatory function, then,
comes into question. Obviously, the state has the right, and in-
deed the responsibility, to regulate the lawyers admitted in that
state. However, does the state have the right to regulate lawyers
who are not admitted in that state, but who are seeking clients
there?
193. ALA. R. PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT 7.2(e).
194. IowA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 2-101(A) (2001).
195. FTC SUBMISSION, supra note 96, at 14.
196. See CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 114.
197. Id. at 155-56.
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This question forces one to examine the underlying legitimacy
of the ethics rules governing legal services marketing. Their pur-
pose is to provide consumers within the state protection against
misrepresentations 9 ' and overreaching as lawyers seek busi-
ness.'9 9 These purposes could not be met, and the legitimacy of
the rules could not be served, if the consumer was only protected
against the lawyers admitted in the consumer's state, but not
against the lawyers who are admitted in another state and are
seeking business in accordance with the rules where those law-
yers are admitted. Therefore, the reach of the ethics rules may go
beyond those lawyers who are admitted in any particular state
and extend to any lawyer seeking clients in the jurisdiction, even
if the lawyer is not admitted in that jurisdiction.
It is possible that the state's reach is determined by the rules
themselves. In West Virginia, the preamble to the ethics rules
limited the application of the rules to those who were regularly
engaged in the practice of law in that jurisdiction. This limited
application served as a successful defense in Lawyer Disciplinary
Board v. Allen, Coale & Van Susteren. °° The defendants were
out-of-state lawyers who solicited potential clients in-person,
allegedly out of compliance with the West Virginia rules.2 ' Since
the lawyers were licensed in other states, they were not deemed
to be regularly engaged in the practice of law in West Virginia. °2
The preamble to the West Virginia rules was subsequently modi-
fled to exclude the limitation of the application of the rules.0 3
On the other hand, South Carolina Appellate Court Rules 418
requires an "unlicensed lawyer" who advertises in that jurisdic-
tion to comply with its rules governing the communications of le-
gal services.0 4 An "unlicensed lawyer" is a person admitted to
practice law in a jurisdiction other than South Carolina. 0 5
198. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 1 (2000) ("Whatever means are
used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful.").
199. See id. R. 7.3 cmt. 1 ("There is a potential for abuse inherent in direct in-person or
live telephone contact by a lawyer with a prospective client known to need legal services.").
200. 479 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1996).
201. Id. at 333.
202. Id. at 319.
203. Id. at 336.
204. S.C. APP. CT. R. 418(b).
205. Id. R. 418(a).
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Lawyers who violate state ethics rules in those states where
they are admitted are subject to disciplinary procedures that may
lead to the suspension or revocation of their right to practice. °6
Lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions, however, are not subject
to revocation of the right to practice law in jurisdictions where
they do not have that right. °7 Therefore, if a state extends the
scope of its rules governing legal services marketing, it also needs
to create the sanctions for the lawyers who do not comply with
the rules of the state where the lawyer is marketing.28 The South
Carolina rule provides for contempt of court, an injunction
against any future violation, and a refund of all fees paid pursu-
ant to any employment that may have resulted from the advertis-
ing or solicitation.2 9
Similarly, Indiana disciplinary authorities brought injunctions
against lawyers licensed in California when those lawyers solic-
ited potential clients in Indiana, in violation of the Indiana
rules.21° Since the lawyers were not successful in obtaining cli-
ents, there was no issue involving fees.211
Expansive interpretations of false and misleading communica-
tions, extensive disclaimer requirements, restrictions focused on
specific types of media, rules that undermine marketing tech-
niques commonly employed for all other services, and the ex-
panded scope of the application of these rules combine to create
difficulties for lawyers and firms, particularly those involved in
client development in a variety of states. In some ways, these fac-
tors also fail to achieve the goals of consumer protection in the
marketplace of legal services. These issues are examined in the
next section.
IV. THE IMPACT OF STATE RULES GOVERNING THE
COMMUNICATIONS OF LEGAL SERVICES
In order to understand the potential impact of individual state
rules on the flow of legal commerce, it is important to look at the
206. See HILL, supra note 12, at 137-39.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. S.C. APP. CT. R. 418(d).
210. In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d 719, 720 (Ind. 2001).
21L Id.
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structures for the delivery of legal services and the function of
marketing within those structures.
The practice of law has been conceptually divided into two
hemispheres: those who provide personal legal services and those
who provide corporate and institutional legal services.212 In its
analysis of lawyer advertising in Bates, the United States Su-
preme Court made at least one fundamentally incorrect conclu-
sion in presuming that lawyer advertising is the exclusive domain
of those who provide personal legal services.2 13 The Court stated
that "[tlhe only services that lend themselves to advertising are
the routine ones: the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption,
the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and
the like--the very services advertised by appellants."214
Personal legal services certainly lend themselves to advertis-
ing. In the 1970s, lawyers began to provide personal legal services
through legal clinics, using a variety of tools that were designed
to lower costs for routine services.215 Standardized forms were
used. Paralegals were leveraged.2 6 Offices were located in malls
and neighborhood storefronts, with less overhead expense than
downtown offices.21 7 The need for volume that would provide an
economy of scale to provide these services was dependent on ad-
vertising."' Although legal clinics did not prosper and have gone
out of business, these economic measures were widely adopted by
219 i aktlawyers providing personal legal services. While their market
ing techniques have broadened in the past two decades, expand-
ing into direct mail22 ° and Internet-based opportunities, 22' much
212. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE OF THE BAR 319 (1982).
213. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1977).
214. Id. at 372.
215. SPECIAL COMM. ON DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., ABA, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF
LEGAL CLINICS & ADVERTISING LAW FIRMS 1 (1990) [hereinafter SURVEY REPORT] (analyz-
ing the adaptation of clinical strategies into non-clinic structures).
216. SPECIAL COMM. ON DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., ABA, LEGAL CLINICS: MVIERELY
ADVERTISING LAW FIRMS? 43 (1982).
217. Id. at 42.
218. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 35.
219. SURVEY REPORT, supra note 215, at 29.
220. See James A. Sweet, University of Wisconsin Survey Center, Report on Survey of
Accident Victims 17 (Feb. 8, 1997) (Report conducted for the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys
Professional Responsibility) (on file with author). The report indicates that 5% of accident
victims who were sent direct mail and went on to hire a lawyer, found their lawyer
through solicitations, compared to 3.5% who found their lawyers from the Yellow Pages
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of the client development effort for personal legal services has not
seen dramatic change in that time.222 The Yellow Pages remains a
prominent method of advertising.2" Television advertising for le-
gal services steadily increases" and tends to focus on personal
injury, bankruptcy, and drunk driving representation.225
Advertising for personal legal services is oriented toward those
who have not used a lawyer and do not otherwise know how to
find one.226 This justifies the need for consumer protection found
within the state ethics rules. Lawyers providing personal legal
services are most likely to operate as solo practitioners or within
a small office.227 They are most likely to serve clients within a
single state and therefore focus their marketing within that state.
Compliance with the rules may be burdensome and may be incon-
sistent with good marketing principles.22' To that extent, the
rules may limit access to legal services and reduce the flow of le-
gal commerce.229
The ethics rules, however, are no doubt far less inhibiting to
those providing personal legal services than they are to lawyers
working in the other hemisphere. States do not generally limit
their rules to those providing services to the uninitiated. The
rules apply broadly to the communications of legal services, while
the most pronounced change in marketing endeavors in the past
twenty years is found among those lawyers providing services to
and another 3.5% who found their lawyers from television advertisements. Id.
221. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 156.
222. SURVEY REPORT, supra note 215, at 21.
223. The heading "attorney/lawyer" is the seventh most referenced topic, with
270,900,000 references in 2000. Yellow Pages Publishers Assoc., Top 300 Headings 1
(2000), available at http'//www.yppa.orgtpdf/Top300_Numeric_20010411.pdf (last modi-
fied Apr. 11, 2001).
224. According to the Television Bureau of Advertising, $225,464,800 were spent on
television advertising for legal services in 2000, ranking it twenty-second among twenty-
five categories. Television Bureau of Advers., TV Basics: Top 25 Spot Television Catego-
ries, TVB Online, at http://www.tvb.orgltvfacts/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
225. See generally, Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Communications on the Internet: Beginning
the Millennium with Disparate Standards, 75 WASH. L. REV. 785 (2000); Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v.
Went For It, 49 ARK. L. REV. 703 (1997); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73
TEx. L. REV. 335, 364 (1994).
226. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 44 ("Promotional ads are frequently targeted to-
ward lower income individuals, less able to find a lawyer through a personal referral.").
227. See Cramton, supra note 30, at 540.
228. See RIcHARD L. ABEL, AIERICAN LAWYER 120 (1989).
229. See id. at 120-22.
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corporate and institutional interests.3 It is in this hemisphere
that the Bates Court misjudged the application of advertising
and, more broadly, legal services marketing, when it concluded
that advertising was the exclusive domain of routine legal ser-
231vices.
Today's technologically-connected global law firm with scores of
offices and hundreds of lawyers is a fairly recent development. In
1935, the average number of lawyers in the top ten law firms in
Chicago was twenty-three.2 32 In the next thirty years, that num-
ber had little more than doubled to fifty-five and one-half.2 33 Over
the next fourteen years, however, the number of lawyers in the
top ten Chicago firms nearly tripled, to 148 by 1979.2" In 2001,
Chicago's largest office housed 489 lawyers.2 35 Today, a Chicago
office of 148 lawyers would only rank twenty-fourth.2 36 Nation-
ally, the twenty largest firms averaged over 230 lawyers at the
end of the 1970s. 3 7 Between 1979 and 1987, that number doubled
as the top twenty firms averaged 527 lawyers.2 38 By 2001, the
largest firm, Baker & McKenzie, had over 3,000 lawyers and
sixty-two offices in thirty-five countriesY.9 The twentieth largest
firm, according to the National Law Journal's list of the largest
250 law firms, is Winston & Strawn," ° which employs over 850
lawyers.24'
The developments in business acquisition have been as sub-
stantial as the growth of these firms. In the first decade after the
Bates decision, some firms providing corporate legal services cre-
230. See infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
231. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 372 (1977).
232. ABEL, supra note 228, at 182.
233. Id. at 311.
234. Id. at 182.
235. Chicago Lawyer 2001 Survey, CHI. LAW, Aug. 2001, at 10 [hereinafter Lawyer
Survey].
236. See id. at 12.
237. ABEL, supra note 228, at 311.
238. Id.
239. Baker & McKenzie, Firm Profile, at http'//www.bakerinfo.com/BakerNet/Firm+
Profile/default.htm (last modified Nov. 2, 2001).
240. N.Y. Law Publ'g Co., National Law Journal 250: The Largest 250 Law Firms in
the U.S., Internet Legal Resource Guide, at http://www.ilrg.com/nlj250/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2002).
241. James R. Thompson & James M. Neis, Firm Overview: Message From the Chair-
man and Managing Partner, Winston & Strawn, at http://www.winston.com (last modified
Oct. 3, 2001).
[Vol. 36:49
AD RULES INFINITUM
ated the position of law firm marketer.242 By 1985, law firm mar-
keters had formed a professional association known as the Na-
tional Law Firm Marketing Association.2' This association has
changed its name to the Legal Marketing Association ("LMA")
and currently has 1,250 members from forty-three states and
nine countries.2' LMA members are employed by seventy-four
percent of the largest 250 law firms.245
Law firm marketers carry various titles, such as client services
director and director of client development.246 Marketing directors
frequently have advanced degrees and several years of experience
in professional services marketing or advertising. 7 In major
firms, they reportedly make between $200,000 and $400,000 per
year.' Most large firms not only have a law firm marketer, but
also a staff of firm employees dedicated to business retention and
development. 9 Among the efforts to coordinate the business de-
velopment endeavors of their firms, marketing staff produce cli-
ent seminars on important and emerging legal issues, place arti-
cles authored by their firm's lawyers in industry publications,
sometimes at a cost,25° and gather intelligence on perspective cli-
ents such as assessing their financial status and industry dynam-
ics.251
Large law firms also employ a wide range of more traditional
marketing endeavors, including client entertainment, directory
listings, holiday cards, identity campaigns, brochures, Web site
development and maintenance, and advertising.2 2 An LMA sur-
vey of law firms ranging from forty-five to 950 lawyers quantified
the expenditures of various marketing costs.25 3 These firms spent
242. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 55.
243. Id.
244. Legal Marketing Association, About LMA- LMA Fast Facts, at http://www.legal
marketing.org/aboutfastfacts.cfmn (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
245. Id.
246. See Lawyer Survey, supra note 235, at 10-12.
247. Martha Neil, Learning How to Ad, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2001, at 42, 45.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 55.
251. Neil, supra note 247, at 46.
'252. LMA Data Reveal Where to Focus Your Marketing Budget, PARTNER'S REPORT (In-
stitute of Management & Administration, New York, N.Y.), June, 2001, at 13.
253. Id.
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an average of $67,400 on advertising, $45,000 on collateral
marketing material, and $41,900 on directory listings. 4
How do these major multi-jurisdictional law firms that have
lawyers admitted in many jurisdictions, serve clients across the
country and around the world, spend hundreds of thousands of
dollars a year on marketing activities, and seek clients in virtu-
ally all venues, comply with the state ethics rules governing the
communications of legal services? It appears many do not. 5
The largest, most prestigious law firms sometimes make good
faith efforts to comply with the various state rules, as evidenced
by the extensive disclaimer of Clausen Miller,256 but some appear
to disregard these ethics provisions altogether. This is not to say
that law firms serving corporate interests are making fraudulent
representations or launching campaigns of deception. As stated
in the report of the ABA Commission on Advertising, Lawyer Ad-
vertising at the Crossroads: "Corporate firms tend to market their
services with a belief that the sophistication of their clients con-
trols the propriety of the advertising."2 5' Firms simply advance
their marketing and spend their client development money in
ways that are consistent with sound marketing principles, with-
out regard to the nuances of state rules that undercut those prin-
ciples.5 Questionable compliance centers on issues of meeting
the parameters of false or misleading communications, including
the absence of required disclaimers, use of client testimonials,
and reference to the specialization of lawyers inconsistent with
state rules governing such usage.
The failure of large firms to comply with the ethics governing
legal services marketing is a combination of several factors. The
rules are too varied and complex as a whole, and occasionally
even contradictory. 59 Compliance with the rules would prevent
the ability of a law firm to maximize its investment in client de-
254. Id.
255. It would be inappropriate for the author to conclude that any particular lawyer or
law firm stands in violation of the ethics of any particular jurisdiction. This is left for the
reader to conclude. For this purpose, the author encourages readers to review the Web
sites of the largest law firms. See http'//www.ilrg.com/nlj250/, supra note 240. Compare
their content to the state rules. See http://www.abanet.orgladrules, supra note 8.
256. See Clausen Miller Web site, supra note 153.
257. CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 58.
258. See HORNSBY, supra note 58, at 4.
259. See id.
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velopment. The rules are designed to protect the personal con-
sumer who has had limited, if any, experience in the selection of a
lawyer.26 And, perhaps because of this latter point, rule viola-
tions against large law firms serving corporate clients are not en-
forced.2 1' Therefore, firms are in the position to assume the risk of
enforcement and discipline as they advance their marketing en-
deavors.
For some, this system of having rules, violating rules, and not
enforcing the rules when violations occur, may seem like the best
alternative. It may appear that no one is harmed when a firm vio-
lates ethics rules that were never intended to apply to its circum-
stances. However, this situation has serious detriments within
the entire scheme of ethical regulation. First, it calls into ques-
tion the morality of advertising legal services. While the Model
Rules focus on the inappropriateness of making false and mis-
leading communications and overreaching through solicitation,
state rules previously discussed tend to demean the function of
client development and suggest that it is morally wrong when it
serves as the lawyer's basis for making a living.262
Also, the complexity and variations of state rules place a bur-
den on lawyers to decide which ethics rules ought to apply to
them and therefore must be complied with. Lawyers ought not
have this discretion. The ability to justify the breach of an ethics
rule for conduct in one area, such as marketing, can easily lead to
the justification of a breach in far more serious areas. To the ex-
tent that the legal profession finds it essential to regulate legal
services marketing, the rules ought to be crafted in ways that are
consistent with the nature of practice and should promote, rather
260. See CROSSROADS, supra note 10, at 109-10.
261. The National Organization of Bar Counsel maintains a Web site at
http://www.nobe.org (last modified Jan. 29, 2002), where it posts disciplinary violations
by topic on a semiannual basis. "Advertising and Solicitation" is one of the topics. See id.
Never has this posting reported a case involving a lawyer from a major law firm under
"Advertising and Solicitation." See id. See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra
note 113 for a report on numerous cases illustrating impermissible conduct in violation of
each model rule.
262. See Mark H. Aultmann, Moral Character and Professional Responsibility, 8 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETMICS 103, 112 (1994) ("One may with some seriousness speak of moral duty not
to steal money. A duty not to advertise in the Yellow Pages, on the other hand, if it is seri-
ous, is serious only because a disciplinary apparatus chooses to treat it seriously."); see
also CHIISTENSEN, supra note 79, at 154 (discussing the professional milieu that justifies
for the regulation of lawyer advertising within the culture of the legal profession).
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than frustrate, their compliance. It is important to examine al-
ternatives to the current maze of state regulations.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT STATUS OF STATE RULES
GOVERNING THE COMMUNICATIONS OF LEGAL SERVICES
There are two alternatives to the current morass of state-based
rules governing the communications of legal services: adoption of
uniform rules throughout the states or deregulation of marketing
by the legal profession.
States may soon have an opportunity to amend their rules to
achieve uniformity and strike a balance to enable the flow of legal
commerce while still providing consumer protection. In 1997, the
ABA created the Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, known as Ethics 2000.263 Ethics 2000's mis-
sion has been to study and evaluate the ethical and professional-
ism precepts of the legal profession, examine and evaluate the
Model Rules and rules of the state jurisdictions, and formulate
recommendations. 26' Ethics 2000 has gathered data and held a
broad series of hearings to gain input from all relevant sources.265
The ABA Commission on Advertising, now known as the Com-
mission on Responsibility in Client Development, was among
those to submit comments. 6 It encouraged Ethics 2000 to modify
the rules governing the communications of legal services in ways
that incorporated new technology-based issues.267
263. See Ctr. for Prof1 Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission on the Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct: Mission Statement, ABA Network, at http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/e2k-mission_statement.html (last modified Mar. 9, 2001).
264. Id.
265. Margaret Colgate Love, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Final Report and Summary
of Recommendations, ABA Network, at http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-mlove-article.html
(June 26, 2001).
266. A Re-Examination of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Pertaining to
Client Development in Light of Emerging Technologies: A White Paper Presented for the
Purpose of Discussion by the American Bar Association Commission on Advertising, ABA
Network, at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/whitepaper.html (July 1998) [hereinafter
White Paper]; William P. Smith, HI & David D. Beckman, Comments on Model Rules Con-
cerning Client Development, ABA Network, at http/www.abanet.org/legalservices/
e2001.html (Aug. 25, 2000).
267. See White Paper, supra note 266.
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In August 2001, Ethics 2000 issued a report recommending a
series of modifications to the Model Rules." 8 Among the recom-
mendations were important changes to the provisions of Rules 7.1
through 7.4.269 The recommended changes are designed to im-
prove the balance between the flow of legal commerce and neces-
sary consumer protection.270
New Model Rule 7.1 would create one overarching prohibition
against false and misleading communications.27' The proposed re-
vision simply deems it false or misleading if a communication
"contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a
fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not
materially misleading."272 Ethics 2000 recommends that prohibi-
tions against the creation of unjustified expectations and unsub-
stantiated comparisons of services be deleted from the rule. 3 The
proposed comment, however, explains thatwould be misleading
under this standard if they lead a reasonable person to form un-
justified expectations or believe an unsubstantiated comparison
was substantiated.2 4 In other words, under the Ethics 2000 stan-
dard, those marketing business-oriented legal services to more
sophisticated clients would have greater latitude in the presenta-
tion of their marketing materials. Those marketing personal legal
services to people who may not have experience in the selection of
a lawyer would have to exercise greater caution to avoid the po-
tential for misleading interpretations.
Model Rule 7.3, which governs solicitation, would change under
the Ethics 2000 proposal to allow lawyers to solicit other lawyers
in-person, including in-house counsel.275 The proposal would also
268. ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Rules of Profil Conduct, Report with Recommenda-
tion to the House of Delegates, ABA Network, at http://ww.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-reportL
home.html (Aug. 2001).
269. Id.
270. See ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Rules of Profl Conduct, Model Rule 7.1: Re-
porter's Explanation of Changes, ABA Network, at http.//www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
rule7lrem.html (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Rule 7.1 Explanation].
271. See ABA Conm'n on Evaluation of Rules of Profl Conduct, Report with Recom-
mendation to the House of Delegates: Rule 7.1, ABA Network, at http/ivww.abanet.org/
cpr/e2k-rule7l.html (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Rule 7.1 Mark-Up] (providing a marked-up
copy of changes to Rule 7.1); see also Rule 7.1 Explanation, supra note 270.
272. Rule 7.1 Mark-Up, supra note 271.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. ABA Conm'n on Evaluation of Rules of Profl Conduct, Report with Recommenda-
tion to the House of Delegates: Rule 7.3, ABA Network, at http-//www.abanet.orgcpr/e2k-
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excuse lawyers from labeling written solicitations as "Advertising
Material" when such material is sent to other lawyers." 6 Stylish
firm brochures directed to lawyers at major corporations would
not have to include this label.277
The ABA began the process of considering, adopting, or reject-
ing the recommendations of Ethics 2000 at its Annual Meeting in
August 2001.278 It will consider the recommendations for modifi-
cations to Model Rules 7.1 through 7.5 at its mid-year meeting in
February 2002 or at its Annual Meeting in August 2002.279
After the ABA has completed its revision of the Model Rules,
states will be asked to consider their adoption.8 ° This will provide
an opportunity for the states to revisit their current rules govern-
ing the communications of legal services and assess their suitabil-
ity to govern this subject by the standards of Twenty-first Cen-
tury law firms and practices. The opportunity to adopt the ABA
revisions will create the opportunity for the necessary state-by-
state uniformity that strikes a balance between the flow of legal
commerce and protection of consumers of legal services.
The other option to overcome the difficulties created by state-
based ethics rules is for the legal profession to cede the obligation
of governing legal services marketing to state legislatures rather
than the states' highest courts. Although the legal profession is
substantially self-regulated, it has embraced legislative controls
in the past. For example, some law firms choose to be governed by
statutes that regulate limited liability partnerships and limited
liability companies. Some firms have readily embraced these
structures and submitted themselves to the terms and obligations
of the laws that permit them.
rule73.html (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Rule 7.3 Mark-Up] (providing a marked up copy of
changes to Rule 7.3); see also ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Rules of Profl Conduct,
Model Rule 7.3: Reporters Explanation of Changes, ABA Network, at http'i/www.abanet.
org/cpr/e2k-rule73rem.html (Aug. 2001) (providing rationale for changes to Rule 7.3).
276. See Rule 7.3 Mark-Up, supra note 275.
277. See id.
278. Ctr. for Profl Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission: Summary of House of Dele-
gates Action at the August 2001 Annual Meeting, ABA Network, at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/e2k-summary_2001.html (Aug. 2001).
279. Press Release, Nancy Cowger Slonim, Media Contact, ABA Begins Action on Up-
dating Ethics Rules, Adopts Election Administration Guidelines, at http://www.abanet.
org/media/aug0l/houseaction.html (Aug. 15, 2001).
280. See id.
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In California, the legal profession is governed by the State Bar
Act (the "Act"), under Chapter 4 of the Business and Professions
Code.281' Article 9 of the Act, entitled "Unlawful Solicitation," spe-
cifically governs legal services marketing.2 2 The anomalous as-
pects of the Act may suggest that state legislation would not lead
to uniformity any more than it now does under the legal profes-
sion's self-regulation. However, if the regulation of legal services
marketing were a legislative function, it is likely uniform acts
would evolve to stimulate the adoption of uniform statutes.
It could be argued that uniform acts are no more likely to re-
sult in uniformity than the Model Rules. Even if legislative provi-
sions did not become uniform, however, those laws would proba-
bly favor the flow of commerce as a reflection of public attitudes
and, of course, be subject to constitutional protections. In other
words, the public is more inclined to favor competition among le-
gal service providers and is more receptive to lawyer advertising
when compared to the legal profession's sentiments regarding
lawyer advertising.2' To the extent that statutes reflect public
opinion, it is reasonable to expect that laws governing legal ser-
vices marketing would be less restrictive on the flow of informa-
tion than existing state-based ethics rules.2"
Research from a variety of sources demonstrates the disparity
between the attitudes of the legal profession and the public to-
ward legal services marketing. In research examining fifteen aca-
demic marketing studies, Cleveland State University's marketing
faculty concluded "that, in general, attorney attitudes toward ad-
vertising are negative while consumer attitudes are positive....
For a profession that maintains direct contact with their consum-
ers, we were surprised to find both the disparity in attitudes, and
the slow rate of change."28 5
281. CAL. Bus. & PROFS. CODE § 6000 (West Supp. 2001).
282. Id. §§ 6150-56.
283. See Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 107, at 340 ("With virtually no exception,
the research has found lawyers critical of advertising and consumers receptive to it."); see
also FTC SUBMISSION, supra note 96, at 7 ("Consumers appear to be less hostile to profes-
sional advertising than lawyers are.").
284. The political system would also create a check and balance against abuses, since
the statutes would be enforced by public officials, such as local prosecutors or state attor-
neys general, who are accountable to voters.
285. Bob Cutler, et al., Alternative Perspectives to Legal Services Advertising: Attorneys
Versus Consumers, LAW. ADVERTISING NEWS, Feb. 1993, at 3.
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Similarly, a report commissioned by the South Carolina Bar
Association stated, "[i]t is clear in the research that consumers
have views on advertising that are significantly different from the
views of professionals. Consumers generally support advertising
and say that informational advertising provides a neutral to posi-
tive image of the profession."28 6 A similar conclusion was drawn
from research carried out in Georgia, Oklahoma, and by the
ABA.287
This research does not demonstrate overwhelming public sup-
port for lawyer advertising, just a higher level of acceptability
than that of the legal profession. For example, in the Oklahoma
research, over fifty percent of the public respondents agreed that
lawyers who advertise on television do a good job of informing
people, while only twelve percent of the lawyers responding
agreed with that position.288 This finding suggests that the public
will call for restraint on legal services marketing that is sufficient
to provide consumers with reasonable protection, but will be less
restrictive than that which has been set out by the legal profes-
sion. The legal profession can then focus its attention on horta-
tory endeavors designed to encourage lawyers to honor the integ-
rity of the legal profession as they market their services.
VI. CONCLUSION
For nearly 100 years, the legal profession has experimented
with the regulation of legal services marketing. As the result of
state-based responsibilities, historical accidents, and some degree
of design, these efforts to regulate have created a system that is
out of sync with Twenty-first Century practice settings. State
rules may tend to strike the necessary balance between the flow
of legal commerce and consumer protection, but when combined
into multi-jurisdictional obligations, they become too limiting for
those law firms competing on a global basis. The limitations and
complexity, combined with infrequent enforcement, result in an
286. A. EMERSON SMITH, JR. ET AL., ADVERTISING & REGULATED PROFESSIONS: REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BAR 6 (Jan. 3, 1995) (unpublished
report to the House of Delegates of the South Carolina Bar, on file with author).
287. See Hornsby & Schimmel, supra note 107, at 341.
288. Id.
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assumption of risk and widespread noncompliance by those law-
yers and firms that are otherwise held in the highest esteem.
The legal profession can either continue to embrace largely ig-
nored ethics rules, or pursue alternative measures designed to
meet the twin goals of advancing legal commerce and protecting
consumers. These alternatives include the state-by-state adoption
of uniform ethics rules, such as those advanced by the ABA Eth-
ics 2000 Commission, or the ceding of the obligation to govern le-
gal services marketing to the public through legislative regula-
tion. Either alternative is likely to result in a system that serves
the interest of the legal profession, practicing lawyers, and the
public better than the morass of existing state-based rules.

